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REVIEW ARTICLE
Towards a global antibiotic resistance surveillance system: a primer for
a roadmap
HAJO GRUNDMANN
Department of Medical Microbiology, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen,
The Netherlands
Abstract
The need for global data about the scale of antibiotic resistance (ABR) in a geographical explicit and timely manner has been
identiﬁed by many stakeholders, including the World Health Organization. This primer should help deﬁning the objectives,
scale, scope, and structure of possible future efforts. Stakeholders and their expected information demands were identiﬁed to
generate an inventory of surveillance objectives. For simpliﬁcation, an original approach was chosen to bundle sets of objectives
that represent common demands and can be addressed by common subject areas, which fall into three areas. Subject area I
addresses clinical demands and focuses on patients; subject area II addresses public health demands by focusing on meta-
populations; subject area III addresses infection control demands and focuses on pathogens. A division into these areas leads to
a separation of surveillance activities suggesting a modular approach which can provide complementary information.
Moreover, the modules address the conundrum of ABR at the complementary levels of 1) patient, 2) population, and 3)
pathogen, which—rather conventionally—follow the operational and professional fault-lines of the main disciplines involved,
namely clinical medicine, public health, and biology. Essential features that deﬁne different surveillance systems have been
listed and taken into consideration when suggesting templates for future efforts. Putting ABR on the global health map is a
daunting task as it requires acceptance, agreements, and engagement but also concessions at many different levels. Given the
existing gaps in the global diagnostic service landscape only a step-wise approach which deﬁnes achievable aims, objectives, and
milestones will succeed to produce a sustainable system of international co-operative surveillance of ABR.
Key words: Antibiotic resistance, bacterial infections, capacity building, epidemiology, global health, public health, surveillance,
whole-genome sequencing
Introduction
The remarkable discoveries of antibiotic agents
between the 1930s and 1960s provided mankind
with medicines that could for the ﬁrst time cure
bacterial infections with somewhat predictable suc-
cess (1). Although far from equitably available, access
to antibiotics has increasingly become democratized
over the last 20 years. This is the result of the bulk
manufacturing of generic antibiotic compounds in
emerging market communities, making antibiotics
more available and affordable. However, this honey-
moon period is likely to come to an end through a
continuous erosion of antimicrobial effectiveness.
Three contemporaneous developments are held
responsible for the current decay: 1) large-scale
selection for antibiotic-resistant bacteria by appropri-
ate and inappropriate antibiotic use, 2) dispersal by
international high-volume transport, and 3) failure of
the market to address dwindling drug resources,
causing a lack of compensatory innovation and devel-
opment. In order to monitor the current situation and
adjust to the trajectories of this disquieting transition,
the need for global data about the scale of antibiotic
resistance (ABR) in a geographically explicit and
timely manner has been identiﬁed by many
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stakeholders including the World Health
Organization (WHO) who has been committed to
ABR surveillance since 1982 (2-5) but with little
success. Therefore, there have been repeated calls
for international collaboration on ABR surveillance
which have lately been reiterated on World Health
Day 2011 (6).
With this primer, a prioritization process about
strategic choices on how to forge an international
collaboration that monitors the spread of ABR
through surveillance should be facilitated. This
primer should also help deﬁning the objectives, scale,
scope, and structure of possible future efforts and
prepare the arguments for the discussions that would
lead to an informed consent.
By listing the relevant stakeholders and their
expected information demands an inventory of
surveillance objectives was created. A pragmatic
approach was chosen to address different sets of
objectives by suitable approaches that would give
form to emerging surveillance efforts to be introduced
over global geographic scales.
ABR and its clinical signiﬁcance and
epidemiology
The loss of antibiotic effectiveness threatens the
success of modern medical interventions at all levels
of health care (primary, secondary, and tertiary). At all
administrative levels (local, regional, national, conti-
nental, and global), this creates a set of speciﬁc chal-
lenges for diagnostic, therapeutic, and public health
interventions that need to be addressed by graded
responses (7). Ignoring HIV, tuberculosis (TB), and
malaria for the time being (for which dedicated sur-
veillance systems are already in place), the clinically
and epidemiologically most important pathogens that
have become resistant against available anti-infective
drugs consist of common bacteria, most of which are
characterized by a predominantly opportunistic behav-
iour (8,9). The health effects they have on the vulner-
able segments of societies, i.e. the young, the elderly,
and patients in hospitals, have not been quantiﬁed and
certainly accrue a signiﬁcant burden of disease globally
(2). Another feature that sets antibiotic-resistant bac-
teria apart fromother perceived threats to public health
(such as emerging infections, zoonoses, bioterrorism,
and pandemic inﬂuenza) is the accelerating dynamic
which makes this health threat (in contrast to the
threats mentioned before) even more predictable.
Yet there are vast discrepancies with respect to the
prevalence and degree of resistance within and
between health care systems. Hospitals generally see
higher rates of infections caused by ABR bacteria than
community care practices. Larger or more specialized
hospitals see more than smaller hospitals (10). Coun-
tries with largely unregulated dispensing and high
antimicrobial consumption seemingly grapple with
more resistance than countries where drug use is
more restricted (11). Moreover, there are many other
determinants that are not yet understood, and these
may include demographic and socio-economic condi-
tions, health care utilization patterns, health care reim-
bursement structures, antimicrobial use in farm
animals, environmental contamination, and lack of
appropriate sanitation and hospital hygiene. All this
may explain the enormous geographic variation exem-
pliﬁed by extremes where at the high end half of all
hospital patients are infected with micro-organisms
that are not responding to last-line drugs (12,13)
and, at the other end, countries that only sporadically
report resistant isolates of any kind (14). It is therefore
clear that there is an urgent need for global surveillance
of ABR bacterial infections in order to address these
pertinent issues.
Objectives of ABR surveillance
Stakeholders, i.e. individuals that have a stake in anti-
biotic effectiveness be it for personal, medical, eco-
nomic, social, political, scientiﬁc, or corporate
reasons, can be broadly divided into two categories,
representing 1) individuals who are immediately
affected by adverse health care outcomes, and 2) indi-
viduals who may be impacted by the wider
repercussions of adverse health care outcomes caused
by ABR. The ﬁrst group consists of current and future
patients (and their families), doctors, clinical micro-
biologists, prescribers, and drug dispensers (pharma-
cists). Their immediate interest lies in the clinical
outcome of individual cases. The second group
consists of politicians, policy-makers, economists, pub-
lic health experts, health insurance companies, health
managers, and infection control practitioners who are
concerned because they are judged for their response to
thepopulationeffects ofABR.Andyet a thirdgroupcan
be deﬁned, consisting of 3) scientists and researchers,
pharmaceutical industry, funding bodies, and global
health donors who share a wider societal or corporate
responsibility. Although coming from different angles,
all stakeholders have a demand for accurate and com-
parable surveillance data. Some of these demands can
be addressed by common objectives, but themajority is
quite diverse and difﬁcult to reconcile and at times are
even mutually exclusive and can probably never be
addressed by a single uniﬁed surveillance approach.
For this reason and in order to simplify further
discussions, anoriginal approachwas chosen tobundle
sets of objectives that address demands that are com-





























this approach helps clarifying the relevant issues during
the prioritization process and when choices have to be
made about the scale, scope, and structure (for deﬁ-
nition seeGlossary) of future collaborative surveillance
efforts. In the following, a non-exhaustive inventory of
surveillance objectives is presented addressingmany of
the common but also highly speciﬁc stakeholder
demands. As can be seen, the objectives are multi-
faceted but were tentatively bundled into three main
subject areas and consist of the following: area I
addresses clinical demands (patients); area II
addresses public health demands by focusing on
meta-populations (populations); area III addresses
infection control demands (pathogens).
Area I: Surveillance objectives addressing clinical
demands (patient-centred)
. identifying drugs with remaining effectiveness
. improving access and availability to effective drugs
. assessing prescribing patterns
. reducing indiscriminate or irrational prescribing
. reducing exposure to unreliable, ineffective,
substandard, and/or potentially toxic drugs
. improving empiric treatment for better clinical
outcomes
Area II: Surveillance objectives addressing policy
demands (population-centred)
. quantifying the occurrence of ABR (incidence and/
or prevalence)
. comparing the occurrence of ABR over time and
across geographical, administrative, and/or
national boundaries (trends and benchmarking)
. identifying the emergence of ABR (horizon
scanning)
. estimating the impact of ABR on public health and
economy (burden of disease, BoD)
. creating the appropriate awareness among
stakeholders and the public (awareness)
. helping decision-makers make informed decisions
about prioritization and allocation of scarce health
care resources (advocacy)
. exploring market and marketing opportunities
(market research)
. quantifying the consumption of antibiotics
(pharmaco-epidemiology)
. identifying the determinants for ABR emergence
and spread (causal inference)
. informing prevention, control, and drug policies
(intervention)
. monitoring the effect of interventions (guidelines
and policies)
Area III: Surveillance objectives addressing infection
control demands (pathogen-centred)
. identifyingandmappingofhigh-riskclones(HiRiCs;
see Glossary) and high-risk elements (HiRiEs; see
Glossary) including novel resistance traits for early
warning, descriptive, and interventional approaches
. understanding the routes of transmission and the
role and behaviour of vectors in the dissemination
of HiRiCs
. understanding the role of different sources or
reservoirs and the diffusion across interfaces
between environmental, animal, and human
habitats
. understanding the ecologic constraints that govern
the dynamics of HiRiCs and HiRiEs
The suggested bundling of objectives into these three
groups also offers an opportunity to reduce the
complexity of the public health conundrum that
ABR currently presents. It allows for a dissection
into three complementary subject areas which—
rather conventionally—follow the operational and
professional fault-lines of the main disciplines
involved, namely clinical medicine, public health,
and biology. But probably even more important, if
translated into appropriate task bundles it could lead
to a separation of surveillance activities that could
provide complementary information about possible
improvements in case management, about the public
health consequences of ABR and targeted interven-
tions, and about the forces that shape the emergence
of ABR in a more intuitive manner.
Scale, scope, and structure of ABR surveillance
systems
Most existing and extinct ABR surveillance systems
differ in scale, scope, and structure which makes it
often impossible to reconcile the information that has
been collected. Importantly, however, all ABR
surveillance systems can be described by a set of simple
attributes. These attributes describing their scale,
scope, and structure are summarized below.
Scale
Type of surveillance. Type of surveillance distinguishes
population-based from laboratory-based surveillance.
In this context, laboratory-based surveillance collects
susceptibility test results from microbiological
specimens taken for diagnostic purposes from
patients presenting with health problems, whereas
population-based surveillance would draw samples




























from people of deﬁned populations such as commu-
nity, hospital patients, etc.
Geo-administrative level. Geo-administrative level can
be divided into surveillance that is local, national,
international, continental, or global.
Sampling approach. Sampling approach can be divided
into active surveillance through active bacteriological
screening of populations or patients on a sample or
more comprehensive basis (on the occasion of house-
hold visits, school admissions, visits to health centres,
or on a single day in the hospital, etc.) or passive
surveillance based on clinical specimen submitted to
microbiological laboratories for diagnostic purposes.
Choice of surveillance sites. In comprehensive surveil-
lance all possible reporting sites are requested to
collect information (e.g. for national mandatory
reporting), whereas in case of sentinel surveillance
only a chosen set of sites (GPs, health centres, or
laboratories) provide information.
Scope
Operational unit of surveillance (OUS). Operational
unit of surveillance (OUS) is the marker or determi-
nant for a health state which is recorded and reported.
For laboratory-based ABR surveillance the conven-
tional OUS consists of the proportion of isolates of a
deﬁned bacterial species resistant to a particular anti-
biotic compound (percentage resistance per pathogen
compound combination). This can be stratiﬁed per
type of infection to guide recommendations for
empiric antibiotic treatment. In population-based
surveillance, individuals (i.e. cases) affected or colo-
nized with resistant bacteria may represent the OUS
using a case deﬁnition and then counted to obtain
incidence and prevalence ﬁgures for a deﬁned
population. For antibiotic consumption it is the
amount of any antibiotic compound dispensed or
administered to patients or animals. There are
many other additional metrics that can be considered.
Species and compound. Species and compound refer to
which named species of bacteria or which antibiotic
compound or class is included into the reporting
scheme. The selection may contain all bacteria
isolated from clinical specimens (or all antibiotics dis-
pensed or administrated) or a subgroup of indicator
bacteria or compounds. The latter lends itself to an
easier standardizationofprotocols, quality control, and
external quality assessment. The former provides a
more comprehensive picture and can be used to cal-
culate drug resistance or effectiveness indices. The
same applies to the susceptibility patterns that should
be recorded. In existing surveillance schemes there is
oftenanagreedprotocoldescribing forwhichantibiotic
compounds susceptibility data should be recorded.
Anatomical site. Anatomical site refers to the selective
reporting of bacteria isolated from deﬁned anatomical
origins. In this manner a distinction between clinically
relevant (infection-causing) bacteria and potential
colonizers or contaminants may be easier especially
if bacteria from primarily sterile anatomical sites are
selected (such as blood, cerebral-spinal ﬂuid,
puncture ﬂuids, mid-stream or catheter urine).
Primary isolates. Primary isolates refer to an elimina-
tion of redundancy by reporting only isolates of
bacteria identiﬁed for the ﬁrst time per patient per
time period. For simplicity the European Antibiotic
Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-Net) treats
primary isolates as ﬁrst bacterial isolate per species,
per patient, per year.
Data. Data refer to the agreement on which data (per
bacterial isolate and patient) will be reported and
included into the database.
Structure
Aggregation level. Systems with data aggregation at
different levels are possible. However, fully anon-
ymized, non-aggregated data are the preferred data
set as this allows for the testing of data consistency,
biological plausibility, and the elimination of redun-
dancy before acceptance and synchronization with a
central database.
Organizational structure. Organizational structure
refers to the degree of centralization of surveillance
systems. Fully centralized systems collect data and
isolates (for conﬁrmation purposes) in central facili-
ties, whereas fully distributed systems collect only
aggregated information at deﬁned time intervals.
There are different degrees of compromise between
these extremes. EARS-Net, for example, uses a hier-
archically distributed system requiring only a deﬁned
data set (consisting of fully anonymized, non-
aggregated data) for reporting to central level and





























and data management to institutes at national level
(federated approach).
Funding sources. Funding sources can be public,
private, or mixed in the form of private–public
partnerships.
Surveillance addressing clinical demands:
module 1, the patient-centred approach
Strategic aim
The aims of this type of surveillance consist of
improving patient treatment by optimizing the empir-
ical antibiotic treatment choices. This should lead to a
reduction of inappropriate antibiotic administration
and at the same time enable the critical appraisal of
the availability of essential drugs. Patient-level sur-
veillance is the most pervasive argument for patient
safety, which can guide antibiotic treatment by local
epidemiology (15). Obviously for the data to be
relevant for treatment decisions, they need to be
generated locally (laboratory-based), in a timely
fashion, and should be stratiﬁed by type of infection.
Operational unit of surveillance (OUS)
The OUS is the proportion resistance encountered
per type of infection and antibiotic compound (see
above). This is obtained by measuring the proportion
(percentage) resistance per pathogen compound
combination stratiﬁed by the etiologic fraction of
pathogens associated with the infection under surveil-
lance. A variation of this scheme is the drug resistance
index which factors local antibiotic use and availability
into the equation (see text box 1).
Scale
Principally conceived as a tool for local epidemiology,
this approach should consist of laboratory-based
passive surveillance providing representative data
for the catchment of a single health centre or health
care collective (see Glossary).
Scope
In order to exploit the full potential of this surveillance
approach, local data collection should include isolates
from all anatomical sites as well as a comprehensive
range of antibiotic susceptibility test results covering
all antimicrobials available for treatment in that centre.
Local data management can also easily record antibi-
otic prescribing patterns allowing for the calculation of
the drug resistance index (DRI), if desired.
Structure
Modern information technology would allow regional
or indeed national linkage of data through real-time
collection of authorized test results with laboratory-
speciﬁc national data aggregation and feedback via
individualized and password-protected web access.
This has been already achieved in many countries
such as Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the
UK. The data form the decision basis for needs-
adapted and locally relevant treatment guidelines
which are essential for optimized and rational anti-
microbial prescribing. National networking of local
data at this scale is, however, technically and mana-
gerially rather demanding. It requires agreements on
IT interfaces, data ﬁelds, and semantic standards (see
Glossary). If achievable at a higher geo-administrative
level, these data become a rich source that can inform
standard treatment guidelines and essential drug lists.
Given that the DRI can approximate the fraction of
infections that cannot be treated successfully at the
current level of access and resistance, it can also be
used as a crude indicator for the expected burden of
disease (BoD) at any given geo-administrative level.
Text box 1: The drug resistance index
Quantifying antibiotic resistance for each pathogen compound combination separately is only understood by experts. A more meaningful way
of deﬁning the burden of antibiotic resistance would aggregate this information into a single index. Such a drug resistance index (DRI) has been
recently suggested (16). It combines the antibiotic resistance against all available compounds into an average, weighted by each compound’s
use. In this manner, a single value can describe the average effectiveness of antibiotic treatment administered in a single facility. The observed
prescribing pattern typically adapts to the local antibiotic resistance when antibiotic susceptibility test results are reported to clinicians by a
microbiological laboratory. Thus, the index would represent an ‘adaptive drug resistance index’ that takes into account prescribing which
adjusts to the local resistance patterns. It would assume values between 0 and 1, whereby 1 indicates the extreme that current prescribing would
be 100% ineffective given the local resistance pattern. The elegance of indexing lies in the ability to describe the decay of antibiotic effectiveness
over time as the antibiotic prescribing pattern can be ﬁxed to a baseline year, i.e. if prescribing had not adapted to a changing antibiotic
resistance pattern (‘ﬁxed DRI’). Moreover, an additional index can be determined in situations where treatment options are restricted by
availability or access, or by public health decisions such as an essential drug list or an existing standard treatment guideline. This ‘restricted
DRI’ determines the treatment effectiveness given these constrains in drug use. Indexing therefore provides a compelling tool for inﬂuencing
decisions at various levels of health care and the public health cascade: at the bedside, for local drug and therapeutics committees, and at the
highest policy and public health management level





























module 2, the population-centred approach
Strategic aim
Instead of providing the ﬁne-scale information at a
per patient per infection level, the aim of this approach
is to generate reliable estimates about how far ABR
has already encroached on populations determining
the size of ABR as a national and international public
health problem. This should furnish the means to
put ABR not only into the context with other public
health threats but also to identify population-level
determinants that can be linked to ABR emergence.
Information can be used for benchmarking and
monitoring of the effects of interventions. Feedback
to stakeholders will create the necessary awareness
and the recognition of antimicrobial effectiveness as
a scarce or non-renewable resource inﬂuencing
consumer choices, policies, and investment into
drug development. Some of today’s continental net-
works (such as EARS-Net, and Red Latinoamericana
de Vigilancia a las Resistencias Antimicrobianas,
ReVALA) already collect and report these types of
data and have had a documented and measurable
impact on national strategies (17).
Scale
Obviously, the gold standard for population-level
surveillance would be active, population-based
screening for carriage or infection with ABR bacteria
allowing for the quantiﬁcation of ABR prevalence.
However, experience with existing systems has shown
that laboratory-based passive surveillance at a selected
number of sentinel sites satisﬁes the information
needs if the sampling condition remains constant
and the sample is representative for a deﬁned target
population. The downside of this approach is that a
population incidence or prevalence cannot be easily
established because the population denominators are
difﬁcult or impossible to assess. The degree of gran-
ularity, i.e. the geographic resolution of measure-
ments, depends on the number of laboratories that
can be recruited into the surveillance scheme. Low
numbers scattered over wide geographical regions will
decrease the conﬁdence in the estimates. Selection of
merely tertiary care institutions will most probably
increase the resistance proportions. Experience with
the EARS-Net, however, shows that national surveil-
lance networks are quite resilient to sample variation
and only a small number of sentinel sites (less than
20% of national hospitals) are required in order to
provide relatively robust estimates of average national
ABR proportions Ciccoilni et al. (unpublished data).
Scope
The principal OUS is the proportion resistance per
pathogen compound combination expressed as a
percentage. However, as a concession to practicality,
decisions should be taken about the scope of data to
be recorded. It has been shown that restrictions, i.e.
limiting the data, reduce the workload for designated
sentinel laboratories and thus improve acceptability,
conciseness, comparability, and coverage of the
surveillance initiative.
An agreement about limiting the reporting to a few
indicator bacteria and indicator compounds would
be a worthwhile consideration. Restricting the report-
ing of susceptibility data to the clinically and epidemi-
ologically most important COBPs (cosmopolitan
opportunistic bacterial pathogens; see Glossary)
provides meaningful information for public health
purposes. This simpliﬁes the implementation of
standard diagnostic protocols, of quality assurance
and assessment schemes, and therefore improves diag-
nostic quality, data validity, and comparability. Glob-
ally,COBPs are responsible for the fastest expansion of
resistance and arguably cause the highest burden of
disease associated with ABR. Moreover, their cosmo-
politan nature makes them versatile markers for local
differences in resistance. This advantage would prob-
ably outweigh the drawback that some important obli-
gate pathogens such as TB and N. gonorrhoeae would
have to remain the remit of existing dedicated surveil-
lance systems. A clear disadvantage would be that an
emergence of ABR in species other that indicator
organisms may be missed.
Susceptibility data can be reported for bacteria
isolated fromnormally sterile anatomical sites (invasive
isolates), which excludes the majority of unwanted
contaminants or colonizers of bacteria of doubtful
clinical signiﬁcance. This could minimize the intro-
duction of heterogeneity and improve comparability
betweenreporting laboratories.Moreover, laboratories
are more likely routinely to carry out susceptibility
testing of invasive isolates over non-invasive ones as
they attain clinical priority. The disadvantagewould be
that some bacteria causing other important infections
suchasupperand lowerairway infections,ordiarrhoeal
disease, remain excluded.
To report only routinely generated susceptibility
data could be another concession to practicality.
Themain advantage lies in data availability and poten-
tial ease of reporting. These data have public health
relevance as they are a reﬂection of the ABR problems
that become visible and to which doctors adjust their
prescribing. However, there are also disadvantages.
Susceptibility data are mostly from patients treated





























patients who frequently attend hospitals and develop
infections with COBPs, they are not necessarily
representative for patients in the community and often
harbour hospital-acquired bacteria which are more
resistant. Moreover, there are issues of health care
utilization, sampling frequency, and diagnostic habits.
Unequal sampling represents the most important
threat to data comparability and needs to be addressed
by agreed diagnostic protocols according to good diag-
nostic standards, regular reporting of sampling den-
sity, and audit.
Finally, susceptibility data should only be reported
for primary isolates. In a very pragmatic manner,
primary isolates can be deﬁned as ﬁrst isolates per
species per patient per deﬁned period. This excludes
bias introduced by repeated sampling of frequent
health care attendants, which also tends to contribute
more resistant bacteria.
Structure
Surveillance addressing policy demands would follow
the laboratory-based sentinel model. A minimum set
of criteria would be required for a sentinel site to par-
ticipate in a national network. The criteria would
include health centres/laboratories which 1) provide
health services to patients who are representative for a
geo-demographically deﬁned catchmentpopulation, 2)
utilize microbiological laboratory services according to
acceptable diagnostic standards, 3) adhere to agreed
laboratoryprotocols,4)useagreedclinicalsusceptibility
breakpoints thatare internationally recognized(Clinical
Laboratory Standards Institute, CLSI; or European
Committee for Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing,
EUCAST), 5) have in place an acceptable laboratory
information management system, 6) have a dedicated
data manager, and 7) participate in national/
international quality assurance/assessment schemes.
Sentinel sites report test results on a per isolate basis
to national data portals. This allows for an exclusion of
non-primary isolates, biological plausibility testing of
reported susceptibility patterns, data quality control
and monitoring of sampling density, and immediate
feedback for quality improvement. National data
managers will bundle local data and submit bundles
at predeﬁned intervals to central databases.
Surveillance addressing infection control
demands: module 3, the pathogen-centred
approach
Strategic aim
Pathogen level surveillance utilizes the genetic/
genomic information to determine the ancestral
relationship between any two micro-organisms. If
place and sampling date can be included, it can be
used to map and track bacteria at all geo-temporal
scales. This is not only useful for the identiﬁcation of
transmission and outbreaks but also to uncover the
reservoirs and origins of emerging high-risk clones
(HiRiCs; see Glossary). Data at this level will provide
answers about the relationship between the emer-
gence of resistance in different ecological niches
such as humans, animals, or the environment and
their spread between hosts and across the interfaces
between these respective habitats. Moreover, patho-
gen surveillance allows for the early detection of
potential HiRiCs or high-risk genetic elements
(HiRiEs; see Glossary) that convey antibiotic resis-
tance, virulence, or transmissibility and is thus an
essential part of surveillance for early warning and
response.
Scale
Population snapshots for bacterial species can be
generated for clinical isolates collected during struc-
tured surveys. These surveys take advantage of exist-
ing surveillance networks asking centres to collect
isolates using a standardized sampling frame. With
the enrolment of representative hospitals that provide
services to sufﬁciently large catchment populations
and a distribution that matches the geo-demographic
structure of the participating country, data will
provide meaningful information. This allows for an
unbiased sample that informs the infection control
audience about the geographic spread, transmission
clusters (outbreaks), and importation of clones with
particular public health importance. Moreover,
isolates with unusual or novel properties identiﬁed
during routine diagnostics or surveillance can also be
collected and submitted and the information com-
pared with existing population snapshots to determine
their likely origin and date of emergence.
Scope
The principal operational unit of surveillance (OUS)
is a measure of the genetic similarity between any two
bacterial isolates determined by genetic typing. This
can be accomplished in different ways using typing
methods that provide biologically meaningful data
(such as DNA sequences) that are robust, sufﬁciently
discriminatory, and which are portable and unambig-
uous. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has recently
emerged as the gold standard and is becoming
increasingly affordable (see Text box 2). With this
technique, similarity can be tabulated in evolutionary
time-scales (time to the most recent common




























ancestor), and resulting phylogenies can be super-
imposed with epidemiological information.
Typing tools can be furnished at different levels of
the ABR surveillance cascade and inform infection
control experts about potential transmission and
outbreak situations (18,19). More in-depth investiga-
tions will focus on particular species of COBPs that
have been identiﬁed as important sources of HiRiCs
and HiRiEs. Typical examples are Staphylococcus
aureus known for the emergence of international
clones of hospital-, community-, or livestock-
associated MRSA, or Klebsiella pneumoniae which
has been identiﬁed as one of the major reservoir hosts
of extended-spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBLs) and
carbapenemases.
Structure
This is a more advanced surveillance approach that
requires a network of well-equipped reference labo-
ratories. But considering the decrease of prices for
WGS and the wealth of important public health
information (about the origin and ecological forces
that determine the success and abundance of HiRiCs)
it can be expected that this technique will soon be
regarded as crucial for international surveillance
efforts in order to identify HiRiCs in a timely manner
and inform early warning and response. Network
participants reveal the required level of proﬁciency
through their submission of sequence data that allow
for simple quality assessment. To that end, databases
need to be freely accessible to all relevant stake-
holders, easy to use, and provide geographically
explicit information.
Implementation
The challenge to put ABR on the global health map is
to make the invisible visible. This has been a daunting
task, conceptually and practically. Conceptually it
calls for the unconditional acceptance of germ theory
and the principles of antimicrobial chemotherapy, the
recognition of natural selection (or, more appropriate
in this context, artiﬁcial selection), and the acknowl-
edgement that laboratory-based analysis of specimens
taken from patients can improve the understanding of
disease processes. Practically it is daunting because
it requires skills and competences and advanced
equipment that is typically only present in diagnostic
laboratories associated with well-equipped health care
centres. It is for these reasons that networks for
the surveillance of ABR operative at a global scale
cannot be built instantaneously but require a guided
developmental process.
Considering the potential demands and the gaps in
the diagnostic service landscape especially in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) a step-wise
approach edging towards a full-ﬂedged international
surveillance initiative is the most likely scenario. Not
all regions need to move at the same speed.
This step-wise approach would entail an agreement
on prioritization of objectives and strategic aims. In
this respect the modular approach suggested above
may serve as a model. It should be emphasized that
the modules suggested above are by no means the
ﬁnal conclusion but represent a workable solution to a
conundrum that very unlikely will be addressed by a
single system. All modules can be implemented
independently or in a step-wise manner, whereby
module 2 requires the least initial investment in terms
of structure and capacity building. Conversely, it
could be envisaged that in underserved regions
some health centres/laboratories start implementing
local data collection according to module 1 and then
consider networking towards module 2. Clearly,
module 3 requires a network of reference laboratories
as suggested elsewhere before (20). Whatever the
choice, all planning steps should detail the visions
Text box 2: Whole-genome sequencing.
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) is the only way reliably to describe the genetic background and genetic repertoire including resistance and
virulence markers of bacterial pathogens. The current epidemic of ABR is caused by the spread of HiRiCs or mobile genetic elements that
encompass antibiotic resistance genes. Acquisition of these mobile genetic elements does not always raise minimal inhibitory concentrations
(MICs) above the accepted clinical breakpoints (deﬁned as susceptible = S, intermediate = I, or resistant = R), meaning that conventional
susceptibility testingmaymiss the presence of HiRiEs in non-permissive genetic backgrounds. If the origins and reservoirs of emerging ABR are
to be reliably identiﬁed and mapped on a global scale, there will be no other choice than searching the genetic contents of bacteria as the spread
of certain extended-spectrum beta-lactamase genes (ESBL) and carbapenemase genes could otherwise be missed. Phenotypic methods based
on internationally accepted breakpoints (S,I,R methods) are a good guidance for clinical treatment but have a limited epidemiological
sensitivity. Sequencing provides not only information about presence and absence about genes or mutations associated with antibiotic
resistance but is the most precise method to determine the genetic relatedness of different isolates which allows for a reconstruction of the
population history and identifying the origins of HiRiCs and HiRiEs on geo-temporal scales
While the prices for WGS are decreasing, the amount of data generated increases in an exponential fashion that dwarfs the development of
personal computing power during the last 20 years (Moore’s law). Indeed, dynamics are four times faster. Results are quickly generated
using bench-top equipment, and pipelines are under development which can deal with the amount of data, to zoom in swiftly on targets of
choice. The price for sequencing at the time of writing is about $100 per whole bacterial genome at specialized genome centres but also using





























for the layout of the total network, and it may be
worthwhile to consider three different stages: 1) the
near future (achievable within 2–5 years), 2) the
medium term (achievable within 5–10 years), and
3) the long term (achievable within 10–15 years).
Based on agreed objectives and strategic aims, a
criteria catalogue needs to be set up that describes the
minimum requirements for the enrolment of diagnos-
tic laboratories as potential sentinel sites and for the
national and regional structures that need to be real-
ized. These criteria will also clarify to what extent
already existing surveillance networks can be utilized.
To be able to assess the capability of existing networks
to form part of a future international network alliance,
a detailed inventory of the scale, scope, and structures
of existing initiatives is an important ﬁrst step.
Following the appraisal of existing networks with
regard to the set objectives, strategic aims, and min-
imum requirements, the outline of the ‘near-future’
achievable network should become visible. It will then
be the task to deﬁne realistic goals/milestones per
country and/or region. This will allow for tallying
upgrading and investment demands with respect to
the structure of national and regional surveillance
networks, external quality assessment exercises,
reference services, and resource procurement. Bud-
geting should include the near-future funding
demands, but also medium- and long-term volumes
for investment.
Declaration of interest: The author report no
conﬂicts of interest. The author alone is responsible
for the content and writing of the paper.
References
1. Greenwood D. Antimicrobial drugs. Chronicle of a twentieth
century triumph. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2008.
2. Laxminarayan R, Duse A, Wattal C, Zaidi AK,WertheimHF,
Sumpradit N, et al. Antibiotic resistance-the need for global
solutions. Lancet Infect Dis. 2013;13:1057–98.
3. WHO. 1981. WHO Meetings – Antimicrobial Resistance.
Available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/HQ/pre-wholis/WHO
BVI PHA ANT 82.1.pdf.accessed 3 March 2014.
4. WHO. 1982. WHO Meetings – antimicrobial resistance.
Available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/pre-wholis/BVI
PHA ANT 82.2.pdf.accessed 3 March 2014.
5. WHO. 1994. WHO Meetings – antimicrobial resistance.
Available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1995/WHO CDS
BVI 95.7.pdf.accessed 3 March 2014.
6. WHO. 2011. World Health Day – 7 April 2001. Antimicrobial
resistance: no action today, no cure tomorrow. Available at
http://www.who.int/world-health-day/2011/en/.accessed
3 March 2014.
7. WHO. 2001. Surveillance standards for antimicrobial
resistance. Available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/
WHO_CDS_CSR_DRS_2001.5.pdf.accessed 3 March 2014.
8. Ashley EA, Lubell Y, White NJ, Turner P. Antimicrobial
susceptibility of bacterial isolates from community acquired
infections in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asian low and middle
income countries. Trop Med Int Health. 2011;16:1167–79.
9. Zafar A, Hussain Z, Lomama E, Sibille S, Irfan S, Khan E.
Antibiotic susceptibility of pathogens isolated from patients
with community-acquired respiratory tract infections in
Pakistan–the active study. J Ayub Med Coll Abbottabad.
2008;20:7–9.
10. Donker T, Wallinga J, Grundmann H. Patient referral pat-
terns and the spread of hospital-acquired infections through
national health care networks. PLoS Comput Biol. 2010;6:
e1000715.
11. Goossens H, Ferech M, Vander Stichele R, Elseviers M;
ESAC Project Group. Outpatient antibiotic use in Europe
and association with resistance: a cross-national database
study. Lancet. 2005;365:579–87.
12. Saleem AF, Ahmed I, Mir F, Ali SR, Zaidi AK. Pan-resistant
Acinetobacter infection in neonates in Karachi, Pakistan.
J Infect Dev Ctries. 2009;4:30–7.
13. Perry JD, Naqvi SH, Mirza IA, Alizai SA, Hussain A,
Ghirardi S, et al. Prevalence of faecal carriage of Enterobac-
teriaceae with NDM-1 carbapenemase at military hospitals in
Pakistan, and evaluation of two chromogenic media.
J Antimicrob Chemother. 2011;66:2288–94.
14. ECDC, 2013. Surveillance report. Antimicrobial resistance
surveillance 2012. Available at http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/pub-
lications/Publications/antimicrobial-resistance-surveillance-
europe-2012.pdf.accessed 3 March 2014.
15. Paterson DL. The role of antimicrobial management pro-
grams in optimizing antibiotic prescribing within hospitals.
Clin Infect Dis. 2006;42:S90–5.
16. Laxminarayan R, Klugman KP. Communicating trends in
resistance using a drug resistance index. BMJ Open. 2011;1:
e000135.
17. Allerberger F, Gareis R, Jindrák V, Struelens MJ. Antibiotic
stewardship implementation in the EU: the way forward.
Expert Rev Anti Infect Ther. 2009;7:1175–83.
18. Reuter S, Ellington MJ, Cartwright EJ, Köser CU,
TörökME, Gouliouris T, et al. Rapid bacterial whole-genome
sequencing to enhance diagnostic and public health microbi-
ology. JAMA Intern Med. 2013;173:1397–404.
19. Harris SR, Cartwright EJ, Török ME, Holden MT,
Brown NM, Ogilvy-Stuart AL, et al. Whole-genome sequenc-
ing for analysis of an outbreak of meticillin-resistant Staphy-
lococcus aureus: a descriptive study. Lancet Infect Dis. 2013;
13:130–6.
20. Grundmann H, Klugman KP, Walsh T, Ramon-Pardo P,
Sigauque B, Khan W, et al. A framework for global surveil-
lance of antibiotic resistance. Drug Resist Updat. 2011;14:
79–87.
Supplementary material available online
Appendix: Glossary
Primer on global ABR surveillance 95
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
ro
nin
ge
n]
 at
 02
:46
 10
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
18
 
